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Surprise! You Just Moved Next to a
Sexual Predator: The Duty of
Residential Sellers and Real Estate
Brokers to Disclose the Presence of
Sexual Predators to Prospective
Purchasers
This simple statement is the essence of Megan's Law: The right
to know.1
- Maureen Kanka, parent of a murdered child
I. Introduction
Under her state's version of Megan's Law,2 Janet, the mother
of three small children is notified that her new neighbor is a
"sexual'y violent predator."3 Specifically, she is informed that her
neighbor spent several years in prison for committing violent sexual
1. Pending Crime Bills, 1996: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1996), available in 1996 WL 117175 (letter of Maureen
Kanka).
2. Under the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexual Violent Offenders
Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994), as amended by Act of May 17, 1996, Pub.
L. No. 105-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345; Act of Oct. 3,1996, Pub. L. No. 104-236, §§ 3-7, 110 Stat.
3096, 3097, all fifty states are required to implement- procedures for notifying people when
potentially dangerous convicted sex offenders move into their neighborhoods.
3. A "sexually violent predator" is define(' as "a person who h.as been convicted of a
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
that makes the peison likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses." 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071(a)(3)(C). "Predatory" offenses are those which are "directed at a stranger, or a
person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose
of victimization." 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(E).
A "sexually violent offense" is:
Any offense that consists of aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as described
in sections 2241 and 2242 of Title 18 or as described in the State Criminal Code)
or an offense that has as its elements engaging in physical contact with another
person with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as
described in such sections of Title 18 or as described in the State Criminal Code).
42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(B).
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acts against children and that the authorities believe he will
continue to engage in such conduct in the future. Janet decides to
move. She contacts her real estate broker and puts her house up
for sale. Janet is concerned, however, as to what to tell potential
purchasers about her neighbor. She wonders if potential purchasers
have the right to know that there is a dangerous sexual predator in
the neighborhood before they move in. Janet's real estate broker
shares her concern. Neither the federal version of Megan's Law
nor the varying state versions of Megan's Law specifically address
this question.'
If potential purchasers are given the right to know about the
presence of dangerous sexual predators in the neighborhood, it may
decrease the selling price of Janet's home or prevent her from
selling her house altogether.5 However, if potential purchasers are
not given the right to know, a new family could move into the
neighborhood unaware that they are buying a house which will put
their children into a position of danger.6 Such a result goes against
the purpose of sex offender notification laws.' These laws are
intended to provide people with information that will allow them
and their children to avoid becoming the victims of a violent sexual
predator.8
This comment analyzes the duty of residential sellers and real
estate brokers9 to disclose unfavorable information to potential
purchasers in the context of sex offender notification statutes. In
Part 11 of this comment, the history, implementation, and policy
behind sex offender notification statutes are discussed. Part III
analyzes the duties of sellers and real estate brokers to disclose
4. See Robert Schwaneberg, Megan's Law May Force Home Sellers to Notify Buyers
About Sex Offenders, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 22, 1996, at 1.
5. See James Abeam, When Your Prospective Neighbor is a Sex Offender, RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), July 24, 1996, at N7.
6. Neither the federal Megan's Law nor the varying state versions of Megan's Law
specifically provide for the notification of potential home purchasers of the presence of
dangerous sex offenders in the neighborhood. See Schwaneberg, supra note 4, at 1.
7. "Megan's Law is an effort to facilitate police protection of the community, to
increase the vigilance of parents in protecting their children from sex offenders, and to
discourage reoffense by sex offenders." Artway v. Attorney General of N.J., 876 F. Supp.
666, 690 (D.N.J. 1995).
8. See id.
9. As used in this comment, a real estate broker or agent is a person employed to
negotiate the sale of real property which belongs to other people. See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 2
(1980). A realtor is a real estate broker who is a member of the National Association of
Realtors. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1264 (6th ed. 1990).
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unfavorable information to prospective purchasers, including the
duty to disclose the presence of a sexual predator in the neighbor-
hood. Finally, this comment recommends that sex offender
notification statutes specifically require sellers and real estate
brokers to notify potential purchasers of the presence of sex
offenders in the neighborhood.
I. Sex Offenders Notification Statuses
A. History
1. The Washington Community Protection Act.-On May 20,
1989, Earl Shriner ambushed a seven year old boy playing in a
neighborhood park in Washington."0 Shriner raped and mutilated
the boy." Following this heinous assault, the public learned that
Shriner had a twenty-four year history of violent sexual assaults
against children.1 2 The public also learned that Shriner had been
released from prison in 1987"3 despite the fact that prison authori-
ties felt he would continue his violent sexual attacks against
children. 4
In response to the public outcry following these revelations,
the Washington Community Protection Act"5 was enacted.16 The
10. See Richard Jerome et al., Megan's Legacy, PEOPLE WKLY., Mar. 20, 1995, at 46.
11. After raping the boy, Shriner cut off the boy's penis and stabbed him in the back.
See id. at 48; James Popkin, et al., Natural Born Predators, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept.
19, 1994, at 66. The boy survived the attack and, with reconstruztive surgery, has made an
almost complete physical recovery. See Jerome, supra note 10, at 49.
12. See Jerome, supra note 10, at 49. Moreover, while in prison for an earlier
conviction, Shriner had confided to a cellmate that he wanted to buy a van and customize
it with cages so that he could more easily sexually molest and murder children. See id.
13. Shriner had been released in 1987 after serving a ten-year term for assaulting and
abducting two 16 year old girls. See David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and
in the 'Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525, 527 (1992).
14. See Deborah Nelson, 'We're in Jeopardy,' Says Victim's Mother, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1995, at A15. Four months after his release, Shriner was arrested for stabbing a 16
year old boy. See Boerner, supra note 13, at 528. Through a plea bargain, Shriner was
sentenced to only 90 days for the attack and subsequently released. See id. In January of
1988, Shriner was arrested for tying a 10 year old boy to a fence post and beating him. See
id. This time Shriner received a sixty-seven day sentence following a plea bargain. See id.
15. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130-.140, 4.24.550, 71.09.010-.230) (West Supp.
1997) (1990 Wash. Laws, Ch. 3, § 117).
16. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 746 n.1 (W.D. Wash. 1995). The Act
provides, inter alia, for registration of convicted sex offenders, compensation to crime victims,
civil commitment of sexual predators, and increased penalties for sex offenders. See In re
the Personal Restraint Petition of Andre Brigham Young, 857 P.2d 989, 992 (Wash. 1993).
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Act contained the first sex offender notification provision 7 in the
United States."8 Under the Act, law enforcement officials were
authorized to release information about convicted sex offenders
who posed a potential danger to the community. 9
2. The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Act.-Cases like Earl Shriner's
continued to come to the public's attention ultimately leading to a
call for a federal solution to the problem of repeat sex offenders.2
Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act21 in 1994 in
response to this call. The Jacob Wetterling Act required states to
establish procedures for the registration of individuals convicted of
crimes against children or of sexually violent offenses with
designated state law enforcement agencies.22 The Jacob Wetterl-
17, See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4,24.550 (West Supp. 1997).
18. See Jerome, supra note 10, at 48.
19. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4,24.550(1) (West Supp. 1997).
20. See 142 CONG. REC. H4451, H4452 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994). The Jacob Wetterling Act was enacted as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. See id. The Act was named in
honor of an 11 year old boy who was abducted by a stranger at gunpoint in Minnesota in
1989. See Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); 142 CONG. REC. H4451,
H4456 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Ramstad). Jacob Wetterling has never
been found. See id. at H4452.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1407!(a)(1). Any state which did not comply with the registration
provisions was to be denied a percentage of federal law enforcement funding. See id.
§ 14071(f).
AS or fanuary 1997, all 50 statcs, nith the &eepfion oi Matacbutr', hve enacted
sex offender registration laws. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-200 to -203 (1994); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.56.840, 12.55.148, 12.63.010-.100 (Michie 1996); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to
-3824 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to -909 (Michie 1995); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 290-290.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT, ANN. §§ 18-3-412
to -412.5 (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, § 54-102r (West Supp. 1997); DEL,
Com ho. N; )), ) 02 1.9. 5 .& Supp. 1996),; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.21-.23 (West Supp.
1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (Harrison Supp. 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-743 (Supp.
1997); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8301 to -8311 (1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/1-10 (West
1992 & Supp. 1997); IND, CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1 to -13 (Michie Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 692A.1-.15 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4902 to -4907 (Supp. 1996);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.500-.540 (Michie 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:540-:549
(West Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11001-11005, 11121, 11141-11144
(West Supp. 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 692B, 792 (1996); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 28.721-.732 (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT, ANN. §§ 243.165-.166 (West Supp. 1997);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1997); MO, ANN. STAT. §§ 566.600-.625 (West
Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to -508 (1995); NEB. REV, STAT. §§ 29-2922
to -2936 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.151-.157 (Michie 1997); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 632-A:11 to -A:19 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C: 7-1 to -11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997);
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ing Act also authorized the states to release the information
collected if such a release was necessary to protect the public.2 3
States, however, were not required to do so. 24 Few states chose
to enact community notification laws following enactment of the
Jacob Wetterling Act.25
3. Megan's Laws.-In July of 1994, New Jersey was one of the
states which had not yet enacted a sex offender notification law.
This changed after seven year old Megan Kanka's body was found
in a park near her New Jersey home.26 Megan had been raped
and murdered. The man arrested for the crime was Jesse K.
Timmendequas, Megan's next-door neighbor.27 It was reported
that Timmendequas had lured Megan into his house by promising
to show her a puppy.2 8 It was also reported that Timmendequas
had twice been convicted of child molestation and, in one of the
previous attacks, he had nearly killed one of his victims.29 No one
in Megan's neighborhood had been aware of Timmendequas' past
history of violent sexual acts against children.3" The public and
Megan's parents blamed Megan's tragic death on this lack of
awareness.
31
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-IIA-1 to -7 (Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168a-168v
(McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. StAT. §§ 14-208.5-.13 (Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01-.99 (Banks-Baldwin 1997);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-587 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.517-.519
(1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9791-9799.6 (West Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-37-16 (Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE. ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-30 to -41 (Michie Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to
-108 (Supp. 1996); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (West Supp. 1997); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (1995 & Supp. 1997); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 5401-5413 (Supp.
1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to -298.4 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130-.140 (West Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-1 to -10 (Supp.
1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § i75.45 (West Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to -306
(Michie 1997).
23. See Joel B. Rudin, Megan's Law, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, Fall 1996, at
4.
24. See id.
25. See 142 CONo. REC. H4451, H4453 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Zimmer).
26. See Pending Crime Bills, supra note I (letter of Maureen Kanka).
27. See Artway v. Attorney General of N.J., 83 F.3d 594, 595 (3d. Cir. 1996).
28. See id. at 596.
29. See Diane Carman, We Deserve Warning When Sex Offenders Come to Town,
DENV. POST, June 1, 1996, at El.
30. See Leo Rennert, Clinton Signs Predator Law, Defends Its Constitutionality, FRESNO
BEE, May 18, 1996, at A4.
31. Megan's mother stated, "If I had been aware of [Timmendequas'] record, my
daughter would be alive. I would never have allowed her to cross the street." Jerome, supra
1997]
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Megan's parents were outraged that the authorities had not
warned anyone about the dangerous proclivities of a convicted
child molester who lived in a neighborhood full of children.32
First in New Jersey and then nationally, the Kankas led a move-
ment to ensure that people would receive information about
dargerous sexual predators who lived in their neighborhoods so
that other parents could protect their children.33 Their efforts
helped lead to the passage of a community notification statute in
New Jersey.34 This sta!,.e came to be known as Megan's Law. 5
The publicity and public outcry that followed Megan's death
also led the federal government to re-examine its policy regarding
repeat sex offenders.36  Looking with approval upon community
notification laws such as New Jersey's Megan's Law, Congress was
dismayed that the states seemed unwilling to act under the
authority given to them by the Jacob Wetterling Act to voluntarily
release information collected under the sex offender registration
provisions." Consequently, in May of 1996, the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 199438 was amended to
require states to release such information.39 This federal amend-
note 10, at 46.
32. See id.
33. See Rudin, supra note 23, at 3; Bradley Inman, Disclosure Laws Getting Complicated,
SAN DtEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 15, 1996, at H1, Adding to the sense of outrage over
Megan's murder was the fact that two other men living in the house with Timmendequas
were also convicted child molesters whom Timmendequas had met while in prison. See
Artway, 83
F.3d at 596.
34. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 to :7-11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); Rudin, supra note
23, at 4,
35. See Rudin, supra note 23, at 1.
36. See 142 CONG. REC. S4921, S4921 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(noting that the fact that "not all states have taken the necessary steps to require [sex
offender] notification is a tragedy in the making"); The President's Radio Address, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 1111 (June 22, 1996) (stating that "[tjoo many children and
their families have paid a terrible price because parents didn't know about the dangers
hidden in their own neighborhood"). President Clinton further noted that while the Jacob
Wetterling Act "gave States the power to notify communities about child sex offend-
ers . . . that wasn't enough .... " Id,
37. See 142 CONG. RE(,. H4451, H4453 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Zimmer).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994).
39. See id. § 1407 1(d). A state that does not implement sex offender notification laws
will be ineligible to "receive 10 percent of the funds that would otherwise be allocated to the
[sitate under [the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3756
(1994)1." Id. § 14071(f)(2).
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ment was also named Megan's Law, in memory of Megan Kan-
ka.' Since the passage of this amendment, all sex offender
notification laws, even those which existed before the passage of
the federal Megan's Law, are commonly referred to as "Megan's
Laws."4
B. State Implementation of Megan's Laws
The federal Megan's Law requires states to enact procedures
for notifying the public of the presence of dangerou. sex offenders
in the community; state- which do not comply will lose a percent-
age of their federal funding.4 2 Thus, it can be expected that all
fifty states will enact sex offender notification laws.43 The federal
Megan's Law does not, however, specify what kind of notification
procedures a state must implement.4 Thus, a state is allowed to
exercise its discretion in determining whether a specific sex
offender required to register under its sex offender registration
statute poses a danger to the public. 5 The state may also deter-
40. See Rennert, supra note 30, at A4. It has been noted that "it is a 'sad commentary'
on our society that we continue to name laws after children who have been murdered or
abducted." Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
41. See id. at 694.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d)(2).
43. As of January of 1997, thirty-eight states have enacted sex offender notification laws.
See ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-20 to -24 (Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAY. § 18.65.087 (Michie 1996);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3825 (West Supp. 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4 (West
Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAY. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (West Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAY.
ANN. § 54-102s (West Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4336 (1995 & Supp. 1996);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (Harrison Supp.
1997); IDAHO CODE § 9-340 (Supp. 1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 152/120/125 (West
Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-1l (Michie Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.13
(West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4909 (Supp. 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN,
§§ 15:540-:549 (West Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit, 34-A, §§ 11101-11144 (West Supp.
1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792 (1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052 (West Supp. 1997);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-17 to -19 (Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-508 (1995); NEV.
REV. STAr. ANN. § 213.1253-.1257 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-B:7 (Supp.
1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-
1 (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.10 (Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1997); OKLA. SWAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV, STAT.
§ 181.586 (1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9798 (West Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN LAWS
§ 11-37.1-11 (Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-490 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-39-106 (Supp. 1996)- TEx. REV. CIV, STAY. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (West Supp. 1997);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (1995 & Supp. 1997); VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-390.1 (Michie
1995 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.550-.555, 9A.44.130-.140 (West Supp.
1997); W. VA. CODE § 61-8F-5 (Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 301.46 (West Supp. 1996).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d).
45. See 142 CONG. REC. S4921 (daily ed, May 9, 1996) (statement of Sen Gorton).
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mine the extent of disclosure necessary to protect the public from
such an offender.46
Without specific federal standards, states continue to use
various methods in implementing their own Megan's Laws. These
various methods of notification fall into four general categories.
47
Type I statutes allow notification whenever law enforcement
agencies determine it is necessary for public protection.418  Wash-
ington's Community Protection Act 9 is an example of a type I
statute. Couched in broad terms,5" it leaves local law enforcement
agencies the discretion to decide whether to disclose information
about a particular sex offender, what information to disclose, and
to whom the information should be disclosed."'
Type II statutes, in contrast, provide specific lists of people and
organizations who are to be notified by law enforcement authori-
ties52 when a violent sexual predator enters a community."
46. See id.
47. States do not necessarily restrict themselves to using only one of the four methods,
some use a combination of the different methods. See infra notes 52, 55, 61 and accompany-
ing text,
48. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-3-412.5 (West Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102r (West Supp. 1997); FLA.
STAr. ANN. § 775.21 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (Supp. 1997); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 692A. 13 (West Supp. 1997); L.A. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:546 (West Supp. 1997);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 11143 (West Supp. 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-33-17(1)
(Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-508 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.1253 (1996);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 181,586 (1993); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37.1-1 I(B)(3) (Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-490 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-106 (Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West
Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.46 (West Supp. 1996).
49. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550.
50. "Public agencies are authorized to release relevant and necessary information
regarding sex offenders and kidnapping offenders to the public when the release of the
information is necessary for public protection." Id. § 4.24.550(l).
51. The Washington Supreme Court has noted that there is no specific procedure which
a local law enforcement agency must follow when releasing sex offender information. See
State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1071 (Wash. 1994). A particular method of notification will
be valid as long as it falls within the parameters set up by the Community Protection Act.
See id. Under the Act, a releasing agency must have evidence of an offender's future
dangerousness, have evidence of a likelihood of a repeat offense, or have a threat to the
comnmunity before disclosure can be made. See id. at 1070. Additionally, any information
released must be tailored to fit the specific danger each individual sex offender poses on the
community and to the public's potential for violence in response to the release. See id.
Finally, the geographic scope of dissemination must be rationally related to the threat posed
by the registered offender. See id.
52. In Louisiana, sex offenders are given the duty to disclose their presence to
desirnated people and organizations by sending out letters and taking out newspaper ads.
See ,A. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542(B).
DUTY TO DISCLOSE MEGAN'S LAW
Typically included on such lists are neighbors and organizations
providing services to children. Pennsylvania's sex offender
notification law,54 which requires notification of neighbors, county
children and youth service agencies, local schools and preschools,
day care certers, and colleges and universities when a dangerous
sex offender moves into an area, is an example of a type II
statute.
'Iype III statutes base notification on an assessment of the risk
which each registered sex offender poses to the community.56
New Jersey's Megan's Law57 is an example of a Type III statute.
Law enforcement authorities notify people and organizations in the
community of a sex offender's presence based on the assessed risk
that the particular sex offender will repeat his or her crime.58 If
a sex offender poses a low risk of recidivism, only law enforcement
53. See ALA. CODE § 15-20-22(b) (Supp. 1997) (neighbors living in specified proximity
to a sex offender); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 152/120 (West Supp. 1997) (schools, child
care facilities, and child protection services); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-11 (West Supp. 1997)
(schools and agencies dealing with children); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542(B) (West Supp.
1997) (neighbors, schools, police, and courts); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792 (1996)
(community, religious, and other organizations oriented towards children); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651-3:7 (1996) (any organization where children gather or are supervised); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584 (West Supp. 1997) (schools, child-care facilities, and state agencies
which work with children); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9798 (West Supp. 1997) (neighbors,
children and youth services, schools, day care centers, and colleges and universities); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1, § 3(e) (West 1996) (notice to be published in area
newspaper); W. VA. CODE § 61-8F-5 (Supp. 1997) (school superintendents, child protective
services officers, and community or religious organizations that provide services to youths).
Illinois and Louisiana also allow for type I statute disclosures. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
54. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9798(b).
55. See id.
56. See ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3825 (West Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4336 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052 (West Supp. 1997); NEv. REV. STAT. § 213.1253
(1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (West 1995); N.Y. CORRECr. LAW § 168-1 (McKinney
Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-12 (Supp. 1996).
Nevada and Rhode Island also provide for type I statute notification procedures,
allowing authorities to broaden notification beyond the risk assessment parameters when
necessary for public protection. See supra note 47 and accompanying text,
57. See N,J, STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8.
58. Factorn relevant in determining a sex offender's risk of recidivism include, inter alia,
whether the offender is on probation or parole, whether the offender is receiving counseling
or other treatment, the offender's response to treatment received, whether the offender is
residing with family, the age and general health of the offender, the relationship between the
offender and his victims, the offender's use of weapons and violence, and the number of past
offenses committed. See id. § 2C:7-8(b).
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agencies likely to encounter the offender are notified.59 If a sex
offender poses a moderate risk of recidivism, community organiza-
tions dealing with children, such as schools and youth organizations,
are also notified.' If a sex offender is deemed to have a high risk
of recidivism, all members of the public likely to encounter the
sexual predator must be notified."
Finally, type IV statutes allow law enforcement authorities to
release sex offender registration information in response to requests
from the public.'2 Generally, requests for sex offender registration
information must be made in writing.6" Two states require
persons requesting sex offender registration information to go in
person to the location where the records are kept in order to
inspect them.' Two other states have set up special sex offender
59. See id. § 2C:7-8(c)(1). All registered sex offenders are subjected to at least this level
of notification. See In re Registrant, C.A., 679 A.2d 1153, 1157 (N.J. 1996).
60. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(2).
61. See id. § 2C:7-8(c)(3).
62, See ALA, CODE § 15-20-22(a)(t) (Supp. 1997); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.087 (Michie
1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4 (West 1988 & Supp, 1997); IDAHO CODE § 9-340(1l)(f)(ii)
(1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.13 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAr. ANN. § 22-4909 (Supp.
1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792(g)(4)(i) (1996); N.Y. CORRE.CH. LAW § 168-p
(McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.10 (Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit, 57, § 584(E) (Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 181.587(l) (1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9798(d) (West Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 23-3-490(A) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); TEx. REV, Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1(5) (West
1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21,5(17) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.1(B) (Michie
1995); W. VA. CODE § 61-8F-5(b) (Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 301.46(2)(e) (West Supp.
1996).
Oklahoma and Virginia restrict those who can request sex offender registry
information to entities that provide services to children. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584;
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.1(B). Virginia also allows for the use of such information for the
screening of current or prospective employees or volunteers who provide child care services.
See id. § 19.2-390.1(C).
California, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, and Wisconsin combine type I and
type IV statute methods allowing notification both when necessary for public protection and
upon request. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
Alabama, Maryland, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas and West Virginia combine type
II and type IV statute methods by listing people and entities that should be notified of
dangerous sex offenders and allowing the release of such information upon request. See
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
63. Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin
require that a request for sex offender registry information be made in writing. See IDAHO
CODE §9-340(11)(f)(ii); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.13(6); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 792(g)(4)(i); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.10; S.C. CODE ANN. § 23.3-490(A); TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1(5)(b)(2)(c); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5(17); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19,2-390.1(C); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.46(2)(e).
64 Alabama and Kansas allow the public to inspect sex offender registration records
at offices where such records are kept. See AtA. CODE § 15-20-22(a)(1); KAN, STAT, ANN,
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phone lines that people can call to request sex offender registry
information.6 In addition, one state requires people requesting
sex offender registration information to petition the courts.
66
C. The Need For Community Notification Under Megan's Laws
No matter which method a state uses to notify the public about
the presence of dangerous sexual predators, all of the Megan's
Laws which have been enacted have a common theme: the belief
that sexual predators pose a continuing danger to the community
because of their high rate of recidivism which cannot be curbed by
either the justice or mental health system.6" By increasing public
awareness of those sexual predators who are likely to repeat their
crimes, community notification statutes seek to allow people to
protect themselves and their children from repeat sex offenders by
denying the sexual predators access to potential victims.68 It is
hoped that the next "Megan," aware that the man across the street
is dangerous, will not go willingly into his house; in addition,
informed neighbors and parents will keep a watchful eye on the
sexual predator who lives across the street to ensure that he does
not have the opportunity to lure another "Megan" into his home.69
§ 22-4909.
65. California and New York have established sex offender 1-900 numbers. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 290.4; N.Y. CORRECr. LAW § 168-p
66. See W. VA. CODE § 61-8f-5(b).
67. See Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691,694 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also 1995 Alaska Sess.
Laws 257, § 10(3) (noting that the "likelihood of the sex offenders engaging in repeat acts
of predatory sexual violence is high" and "[slexually violent predators generally have
antisocial personality features that are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment
modalities"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(2)(b) (West Supp. 1997) (finding that violent and
repeat sex offenders pose a "high risk of engaging in sexual offenses even after being
released from incarceration or commitment"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9791(a)(2) (noting
that "sexually violent predators pose a high risk of engaging in further offenses even after
being released from incarceration or commitments"). Some experts suggest that the
recidivism rate of convicted sex offenders is as high as 40 to 75 percent. See Jerome, supra
note 10, at 46.
68. See 142 CONG. REC. H4451, H4454 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Schroeder); 142 CONG. REC. H4451-02, H4455 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Jackson-Lee).
69. See Claire M. Kimball, A Modern Day Arthur Dimmesdale: Public Notification When
Sex Offenders Are Released into the Community, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (1996)
(discussing the goals of Megan's Laws). See also 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 908(b) (West)
(declaring that "[i]t is a compelling and necessary public interest that the public have
information concerning [sexual predators] to allow members of the public to adequately
protect themselves and their children from these persons"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-3-412.5(6.5)(a) (West Supp. 1997) (declaring that dissemination of sex offender
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D. Why Potential Home Purchasers Need to be Informed Under
Megan's Laws
The presence of a sexual predator in the neighborhood who
poses a danger to children and imposes the need for extra vigilance
can be seen as a detriment to the neighborhood, materially
affecting the enjoyment and value of property.7" Thus, the
question arises whether potential home purchasers should be made
aware of information on sexual predators before becoming
members of the community."t Sex offender notification statutes
are silent on notification procedures to be followed regarding
potential newcomers to the community.72
Under the various Megan's Laws which have been enacted,
police or other law enforcement officials have the duty of dissemi-
nating sex offender registration information to people living in
areas into which dangerous sexual predators move.73 If law
enforcement authorities are given the additional duty of warning
potential home purchasers of dangerous sexual predators, proce-
dures for tracking people considering buying a home in those
neighborhoods would have to be implemented in addition to the
established procedures for tracking the movements of the sexual
predators; this would greatly burden the police.7 4
In contrast, home sellers and real estate brokers are already in
close contact with potential buyers as part of their efforts to sell
homes. Additionally, home sellers are apprised of the presence of
dangerous sexual predators in the neighborhood through their
state's respective Megan's Law.75 Real estate brokers, as agents
of the home sellers,76 are in a position to obtain information about
sexual predators in the neighborhood from the home sellers.77
information to the public is necessary to allow people "to adequately protect themselves and
their children" from sexual predators).
70. See Aheam, supra note 5, at N7.
71. See Schwaneberg, supra note 4, al 1; Inman, supra note 33, at Hl.
72. See statutes cited supra note 43; Inman, supra note 33, at HI.
73. See supra Part l.B.
74. A 1994 report details how simply establishing procedures for registering sex
offenders overburdened Californian police. See Aurelio Rojas & Thaai Walker, Sex Offender
Registration System Failing; Police Say its Outdated, Ignored--and Little Hindrance to New
Crimes, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1994, at At.
75. See supra Part 11.B.
76. See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 25 (1980).
77. Many real estate brokers require sellers to disclose material information about a
property before the brokers will agree to represent them. See Philip Lapatin, Sale of House
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Courts and legislatures have already determined that sellers and
real estate brokers have the duty to disclose structural
deficiencies, 8 hazardous lead levels,"9 and various other home
defects. Consequently, these two branches of government should
similarly conclude that home sellers and real estate brokers are in
the best position to inform potential purchasers of the presence of
dangerous sexual predators in the neighborhood.
Residential sellers and real estate brokers, however, have no
statutorily prescribed duty to disclose such information to potential
purchasers.") Moreover, there is no direct common law precedent
that places such a duty on residential sellers and real estate
brokers." While in two states real estate brokers are statutorily
exempt from a duty to disclose sex offender information, 2 the
same is not true of residential home sellers. Thus, in all but a
handful of states, the issue of whether a residential home seller or
real estate broker has a duty to inform prospective buyers of the
presence of a dangerous sexual predator in the neighborhood has
been overlooked.
with Ghosts Might Return to Haunt You, SALT LAKE TRB., Oct. 29, 1995, at DO (noting
that the National Association of Realtors advises brokers to condition representation of a
seller on the seller's cooperation in disclosing things which would potentially be material to
a real estate transaction); Jay Romano, Realty Law Changing to. 'Let the Seller Reveal',
PLAIN DtFALrFR (Cleveland), Oct. 20, 1996, at IF (describing private disclosure form which
one realty company requires sellers to fill out before it will represent them). Cf. Strawn v.
Carnoso, 638 A.2d 141, 149 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994) (noting that "[slince the brokers are agents
of the seller, their duty to the purchasers is at least coextensive with that of the seller").
78. See, e.- Layman v. Binns, 519 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio 1988); Thacker v. Tyree, 297
S.E.2d 885 (W. V. I
79. See 42 U.S.,C. § 4852J(a)(1), (4) (1996).
80. See statutes cited supra note 43.
81. Louisiana's attorney general released an advisory opinion stating that the presence
of a sex offender in a neighborhood would not have to be disclosed to prospective home
purchasers. See Op. La, Att'y Gen. No. 94-332 (Sept. 2, 1994). Nor could homeowners be
compensated for any decrease in property value attributed to a sex offender's presence in
the neighborhood. See id. Such opinions do not have the effect of law, however, they are
generally followed until the legislature or the courts formally decide the issue. See Ed
Anderson, Realtors Can't Lie About Sex Felons, Nnw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNF, Sept, 28,
1994, at 132.
82. See MINN. STAT. ANN § 244.052(8) (West Supp. 1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 9799.5 (West Supp. 1997).
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I1. The Duty to Disclose Unfavorable Information in Real
Estate Transactions
Complicating the issue of whether home sellers and real estate
brokers have a duty to disclose the presence of sexual predators to
prospective purchasers is the fact that the information which home
sellers and real estate brokers are required to disclose to potential
buyers varies from state to state.83 Depending on. the state,
residential home sellers and real estate brokers may have no duty
to disclose any information to prospective purchasers,84 they may
have to disclose only information of which they are already aware
and which is deemed material to the transaction," or they may
have a duty to actively seek out material information regarding a
property and disclose it to prospective purchasers.86
Even in states in which home sellers or real estate brokers
have no duty to disclose any information, they are still under a duty
to refrain from fraudulently misrepresenting a property to a
prospective purchaser.87 Additionally, states requiring some form
of disclosure differ as to the kind of information that must be
disclosed.8 8 A state that requires disclosure of structural defects89
may or may not also require the disclosure of legal encumbrances
affecting the property," drainage problems,9' termite
83. See Katherine A. Pancak et al., Residential Disclosure Laws: The Further Demise Of
Caveat Emptor, 24 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 292 (1996).
84. See discussion infra Part III.A.
85. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
86. A minority of states require real estate brokers to actively inspect a property for
defects so that they can then be disclosed to buyers. See Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 383, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a real estate broker has a duty to conduct
a "reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residential property listed for sale and
to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of
the property that such an investigation would reveal"); Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person
Fin. Ctr., Inc., 686 P.2d 262, 266 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that "[ulnder some
circumstances, a broker may have a duty to disclose defects that an inspection would
reveal"); Secot v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 n.1 (Utah 1986) (noting its approval of the
Easton decision); Grube v. Daun, 496 N.W.2d 106, 113 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (observing that
the state administrative code imposes a duty on brokers to conduct reasonably competent
and diligent investigations to determine the existence of material facts which, then, must be
disclosed).
87. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
88. See discussion infra Part 1I1,B2.
89. See Layman v. Binns, 519 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio 1988); Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885
(W. Va. 1982).
90. See, e.g., Formento v. Encanto Bus. Park, 744 P.2d 22, 27 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(imposing duty to disclose that property was subject to zoning laws); Gilbey v. Cooper, 310
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infestations,9 2 past murders on the property,93 ghosts and polter-
geists haunting the property,94 the proximity of toxic waste
dumps,9" or a myriad of other matters which could conceivably
affect the value and desirability of a particular property.
A. Caveat Emptor: No Duty to Disclose
Historically, the common law doctrine of caveat emptor9 6 has
governed the sale of real property in the United States.97 Its
precepts form the basis from which the modern law of real estate
sales has evolved.9" Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, home
sellers and real estate brokers are under no duty to disclose
unfavorable information about the condition of a property to
potential purchasers in real property transactions.9  Instead,
caveat emptor assumes that all parties involved in a real estate
transaction have the same capabilities and opportunities to gather
information about the property.m Each party must look out for
their own interests0 1  Therefore, buyers are able to discover
N,E.2d 268, 270 (Ct. of CP. Ohio 1973) (requiring disclosure that the property was
encumbered by easements).
91. See Shane v. Hoffmann, 324 A.2d 532 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974),
92. See Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 674 (Wash. 1960).
93. See Reed v. King, 193 Cal Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
94. See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
95. See Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
96. The doctrine of caveat emptor provides in full, caveat emptor, qui ignorare non
debuit quod jus alienum emit, "[I]et a purchaser, who ought not be ignorant of the amount
and nature of the interest which he is about to buy, exercise proper caution." Alan M.
Weinberger. Let The Buyer Be Well Informed?-Doubting The Demise Of Caveat Emptor,
55 MD. L. REV. 387, 388 n.5 (1996) (citing HERBERT BROOME, A SELECrION OF LEGAL
MAXIMS 528 (1939)).
97. See generally Weinberger, supra note 95 (discussing the history and application of
caveat emptor in real estate transactions).
98. See id.
99. See Quashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (noting that under
the doctrine of caveat emptor "there is no duty to disclose no matter how unfair").
100. See Jones v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1037, 1046 (S.D. Tex. 1996). This assumption
arose from the fact that the doctrine of caveat emptor evolved at a time when society was
agrarian in nature. See Weinberger, supra note 95, at 391-92. Houses were not equipped
with central heaig, electricity, indoor plumbing, or other modem conveniences; they were
simple, pre-industrial structures whose construction and inner workings were easily
comprehended by the ordinary buyer. See id. at 392. Under these circumstances, neither
the seller nor the buyer had an advantage over the other; real property transactions were
seen as "an arn's length proposition with wits matched against skill." Id.
101. "The doctrine of caveat emptor requires that a buyer act prudently to assess the
fitness and value of his purchase and operates to bar the purchaser who fails to exercise due
care from seeking the equitable remedy of rescission." Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d
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unfavorable information about the property only through
investigation and inquiry.1
2
B. Limiting Caveat Emptor: The Duty to Disclose When Justice,
Equity, and Fair Dealing Demand It
In modern times, courts have become dissatisfied with strict
adherence to the doctrine of caveat emptor because it allows sellers
and real estate brokers to take advantage of a buyer's ignorance by
remaining silent with respect to unfavorable conditions on a
property. 3 In the modern economy, courts recognize that buyers
are not necessarily equal to sellers and real estate brokers in their
capabilities and opportunities to access information concerning real
property that is for sale."° The seller, having lived on the pro-
perty for some length of time, will be aware of some unfavorable
information which cannot be discovered by a buyer, even with
diligent investigation."5
Furthermore, the purchase of a home is the most important
and expensive transaction that the average home buyer will ever
undertake."° In addition, the average home buyer only under-
672, 676 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
102. "As a general rule, [under the doctrine of caveat emptor] the burden is upon a
purchaser of real property to discover defects." Van Deusen v. Snead, 441 S.E.2d 207, 210
(Va. 1994). Buyers are able to discover unfavorable information regarding a property on
their own when unfavorable facts concerning a property are "open to observation" or
"discoverable on reasonable inspection," and the buyer has the "unimpeded opportunity to
examine the property." Layman v. Binns, 519 N.E.2d 642, 643 (Ohio 1988).
103. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625,628 (Fla. 1985) (noting that "[o]ne should
not be able to stand behind the impervious shield of caveat emptor and take advantage of
another's ignorance."); Beavers v. Lamplighters Realty, Inc., 556 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1976) (concluding that caveat emptor is "a doctrine that exalts deceit, condemns fair
dealing, and scorns the credulous"); Quashknock, 445 A.2d at 131 (Spaeth, J., concurring)
("[i1t does not follow that law should be satisfied with saying, 'You can do anything so long
as you don't actually cheat.'").
104. See, e.g., Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 763 (Alaska 1982) (noting that "[p]arties
to real estate transactions frequently do not deal on equal terms"); McDonald v. Mianecki,
398 A.2d 1283, 1289 (N.J. 1979) (describing the average home purchaser as lacking "the skill
and expertise necessary to make an adequate inspection" of a property); Michaels v. Brook-
chester, Inc., 140 A.2d 199, 201 (N.J. 1958) (noting that caveat emptor, while "suitable for
the agrarian setting in which it was conceived" has "lagged behind changes in dwelling habits
and economic realities" in the modern economy); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562
(Tex. 1968) (describing the doctrine of caveat emptor as "an anachronism patently out of
harmony with modem home buying practices").
105. See Colgan v. Washington Realty Co., 879 S.W.2d 686, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
See also supra Part III.B.2.
106. See Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 150 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
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takes such a transaction once or twice in a lifetime."7 In con-
trast, real estate brokers are professionals who deal with real estate
transactions on a daily basis. 8 Real estate brokers hold them-
selves out to the public as experts in real property transactions.0 9
Thus, buyers tend to rely on the expertise of real estate bro-
kers."" Furthermore, many buyers fail to realize that the real
estate broker is actually the seller's broker," In recognition of
these facts, many courts are willing to limit the application of the
doctrine of caveat emptor and, instead, impose duties of disclosure
on sellers and real estate brokers "whenever justice, equity, and fair
dealing demand it."" 2
1. The Duty to Avoid Fraudulent Misrepresentation. -All
states recognize the duty of home sellers and real estate brokers to
avoid fraudulently misrepresenting 3 a property to purchas-
107. See id.
108. See Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
109. See Bevins, 655 P.2d at 763.
110. See Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See also Kathy Barrett Carter, State Justices to
Decide if Developer Should Have Told Buyers of Landfill, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
Jan. 5, 1995, at 20 (noting that "one reason people go to real estate agents is they know
neighborhoods and have the expertise to recommend areas they believe to be good values").
111. See Martin Dyckman, Realtors Pushing Bill that Protects Them, Not Consumers, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at 3D; Christine M. Goldbeck, License Reform Would
Clarify Brokers' Duties, E. PA. Bus. J., Apr. 1, 1996, at 14.
112. W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31
(1936). See also Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985) (noting that the "law
appears to be working towards the ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material
facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it"); Posner v. Davis, 395
NE.2d 133, 137 (I11. App. Ct. 1979) (observing that the "modem trend in the law regarding
the sale of a home is away from strict adherence to the doctrine of caveat emptor"); Strawn,
638 A.2d at 147 (declaring that "[clonsistent with the doctrine of justice and fair dealing,
caveat emptor ... can no longer be immutable or inflexible"); Beavers v. Lamplighters
Realty, Inc., 556 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (recognizing that the "time had
come ... to recognize that the rule of caveat emptor is not founded on a high standard of
morality and to outlaw use of this ally of dishonesty"); Quashknock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121,
126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (stating that the "modem judicial trend is away from a strict
application of the caveat emptor doctrine and towards the more fair and equitable
doctrine").
113. The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are: (1) a false representation of fact;
(2) knowledge by the maker of the representation that the representation is false (or reckless
disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement); (3) intent to induce the recipient to rely
on the information; (4) justifiable reliance upon the representation by the recipient; and (5)
damage to the recipient resulting from the reliance on the representation. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-
526, 537, 541, 552C (1976); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS,
§ 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984).
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ers." '4 Home sellers and real estate brokers cannot intentionally
disclose inaccurate information which is material'15 to a purchas-
er's decision to buy property."t 6 Nor can they actively con-
ceal"1 7 material information about a property from buyers.18
Such conduct interferes with buyers' capabilities and opportunities
to gather information about a property and judge the merits of the
transaction for themselves."1 9 Therefore, when sellers and real
114. See generally Paula C. Murray, Aids, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and
Sellers Disclose?, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689,690-91 (1992) (discussing misrepresentation
in the sale of real estate).
115. Under the Restatement of Torts, information is considered material if:
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or
(b) the maker of the misrepresentation knows or has reason to know that its
recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his
choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1976); The Restatement of Contracts describes
information as material "if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his
assent" or "if the maker knows that for some special reason it is likely to induce the
particular recipient to manifest his assent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162
(1979). Determinations as to the materiality of specific types of information are fact specific
and, thus, vary from state to state.
116. See, e.g., Fennell Realty Co. v. Martin, 529 So. 2d 1003, 1004 (Ala. 1988) (broker
failed to disclose a defect in the heating and cooling system of the house after direct inquiries
by the buyers); Wedig v. Brister, 469 A.2d 783, 786 (Conn. App. Ct. 1983) (seller failed to
reveal the illegality of sewage system in response to direct inquiry of buyer); Pinger v.
Guaranty Inv. Co., 307 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (real estate agent falsely
represented that house built on landfill was built on solid rock); McGerr v. Beals, 145
N.W.2d 579, 582 (Neb. 1966) (seller and real estate broker misrepresented that a house
subject to flooding had a dry basement); Keith v. Wilder, 86 S.E.2d 444, 447 (N.C. 1955)
(real estate agent falsely stated that land belonging to another party was part of property
that was for sale); Smith v. Renant, 564 A.2d 188, 190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (real estate
broker misrepresented major termite damage by describing it as being minor); Ware v. Scott,
257 SE.2d 855, 856 (Va. 1979) (seller misrepresented that all water problems in house had
been repaired even though flooding continued to be a problem).
117. The active concealment of a fact is regarded as the equivalent of a false statement
of fact. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 160 (1979); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (1976).
118. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Skubiak, 618 NE.2d 1013, 1016 (I1. App. Ct. 1993) (carpeting
glued to steps to conceal structural damage); A.S., Inc. v, Sanders, 835 F. Supp. 1349, 1351
(D. Kan. 1993) (drums containing toxic wastes buried on property); Barylski v. Andrews,
439 S.W.2d 536, 539-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (fire damage concealed by paint, paper, plaster,
and wallboard); Flakus v. Schug, 329 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Neb. 1983) (two sump pumps hidden
in holes in basement); May v. Hopkinson, 347 SE.2d 508, 510 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (moisture
and termite damage concealed by patching rotten areas and showing buyer repair estimates
which omitted reference to damage); Van Deusen v. Snead, 441 S.E.2d 207, 209 (Va. 1994)
(new mortar put in cracks around foundation of house and materials placed in front of cracks
in basement).
119. See Van Deusen, 441 S.E.2d at 210.
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estate brokers engage in such misrepresentation, buyers are
relieved of their burden to protect their own interests under the
doctrine of caveat emptor. °
Two courts have addressed misrepresentations involving sex
offenders and sex crimes in connection with property transac-
tions." The first, the Texas Court of Appeals, held a real estate
broker liable for a fraudulent misrepresentation"' made to buyers
regarding an accused sex offender who had formerly lived in the
house which was sold to the buyers."2 Prior to buying the home,
the purchasers had asked the realtor who the previous owner of the
house had been. 24 The realtor knew that the previous owner had
been accused of molesting several children in the house."2 5
Nevertheless, he told the purchasers that he did not know who the
previous owner was.t26 The court concluded that the buyers'
immediate attempt to cancel the transaction upon learning the truth
about the previous occupant of the house"2 showed that the
information was material to the transaction; the real estate broker's
misrepresentation had induced the buyers into buying a home
which they would not have bought otherwise.28 Therefore, the
court found that the real estate broker had committed a fraudulent
misrepresentation by answering the buyers' direct inquiry untruth-
fully.
1 29
Similarly, an Ohio court determined that a seller could be held
liable for misrepresentations made to a buyer regarding sexual
offenses which had taken place on the premises and in the
120. See Van Camp v. Bradford, 623 N.E. 2d 731, 736 (Ct. of C.P. Ohio 1993).
121. See Sanchez v. Guerrero, 885 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. App. 1994) and Van Camp, 623
N.E,2d at 731.
122. The cause of action in this case was brought under Texas's Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (West 1987
& Supp. 1997). See Sanchez, 885 S.W,2d at 487. Many states have enacted consumer
protection statutes which allow buyers to hold real estate agents liable for fraudulent
misrepresentation without having to prove intent, reliance, or actual damages. See generally
Elizabeth A Dalberth, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in Real Estate Transactions:
The Duty to Disclose Off-Site Environmental Hazards, 97 DicK. L. REv. 153 (1992)
(discussing the duties of sellers and real estate brokers under consumer protection statutes).
123. See Sanchez, 885 S.W,2d at 487.
124. See id. at 492.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127, The buyers saw a news program on TV describing alleged acts of molestation which
had occurred in the house. See id. at 489.




immediate neighborhood of the house that the buyer pur-
chased.3 ' Prior to purchasing the home, the buyer had asked the
seller why there were bars on the basement windows. 31 The
seller told the buyer that the bars were there due to a burglary
which had occurred sixteen years earlier and that there was no
current reason for their presence.'32 The seller did not mention,
however, that the former occupant of the house had been raped,
that the rapist had recently attacked women in neighboring homes,
and that the rapist was still at large in tne neighborhood.
33
The court concluded that, since the buyer was a single mother
who had two teenage daughters, the seller should have known that
information about sex offenses which had recently occurred in the
house and neighborhood would be important to the buyer's
decision to purchase the house.'34 Therefore, the court concluded
that such information was material to the transaction. 35  The
court also noted that the buyer's inquiry about the bars on the
windows was directed at obtaining information about the safety of
the premises.'36 Because the seller's response misrepresented the
safety of the premises, the court found that the response could be
construed as either a fraudulent misrepresentation or a fraudulent
concealment of a material fact.
137
These two cases indicate that if a prospective purchaser
directly asks a seller or real estate broker about the presence of sex
offenders in the neighborhood, and the seller or real estate broker
knows about the presence of dangerous sex offenders due to
Megan's Laws, the seller or broker must answer truthfully or face
potential liability for fraudulent misrepresentation or conceal-
ment.3 s  In addition, these cases suggest that if a buyer asks
about the identity of neighbors or the safety of the neighborhood,
130. See Van Camp v. Bradford, 623 N.E.2d 731 (Ct. of C.P, Ohio 1993).
131. See id. at 734,
132. See id.
133 See id.
134. See id. at 740.
135. See Van Camp, 623 N.E.2d at 740.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. In Louisiana, the State Attorney General's Office released an opinion which stated
that although the state's registration and notification statutes contain no provisions obligating
a seller to disclose the presence of a registered sex offender to prospective homebuyers, "[ilf
asked if a sex offender lives in the neighborhood, [the seller] must reply honestly because
to do otherwise would be fraudulent." Op. La. Att'y Gen. No, 94-332 (Sept. 2, 1994).
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sellers and real estate brokers must disclose known information
about dangerous sex offenders to the buyer.
2. The Duty to Disclose Known Latent Defects. -Without a
direct inquiry by the buyer, however, sellers and real estate brokers
who simply remain silent and say nothing about unfavorable
conditions on a property that is for sale do not commit fraudulent
misrepresentation even when they are fully aware of the unfavor-
able conditions.139 Home sellers and real estate brokers can,
nevertheless, be held liable for their silence when they fail to
disclose their knowledge of unfavorable conditions which materially
affect a property, but which are not open to observation or
discoverable upon reasonable investigation by prospective purchas-
ers."4 Such conditions are known as latent defects. 4' Because
latent defects are not discoverable even after diligent investiga-
tion,"'42 courts are willing to relieve buyers of their ordinary
burden under caveat emptor to discover these defects for them-
selves. Consequently, in the interests of justice, equity, and fair
dealing, courts have recognized that home sellers and real estate
brokers have a duty to disclose latent defects to prospective
purchasers in two situations: when latent defects endanger the
139. "In the absence of a fiduciary relationship, mere nondisclosure of all material facts
in an arm's length transaction is ordinarily not actionable misrepresentation unless some
artifice or trick has been employed to prevent the representee from making further indepen-
dent inquiry." Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135 So. 2d 876, 882 (Fla. 1961). Silence,
however, may be actionable as negligent or innocent misrepresentation. See discussion infra
Part II.B.2.a-b.
140. See, e.g., Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1370 (Ohio 1979) (noting that it is
inappropriate to apply the doctrine of caveat emptor in cases involving latent defects whose
presence "was not detectable by [the buyer] upon reasonable inspection"). Accord Lingsch
v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963); Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla.
1985); Posner v. Davis, 395 N.E.2d 133 (Il. App. Ct. 1979); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317
A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672 (Wash. 1960); Thacker v. Tyree, 297
S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982).
141. See Layman v. Binns, 519 N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ohio 1988) (defining latent defects).
142. See Miles, 388 N.E.2d at 1370.
1997]
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health and safety of buyers'43 and when latent defects are deemed
material to the transaction.'"
a. The Duty to Disclose Latent Defects Which Endanger Health
and Safety.-Courts find that concerns about human safety, coupled
with the principles of justice, equity, and fair dealing, are compel-
ling reasons for concluding that there is a duty to disclose latent
defects which endanger the health and safety of buyers.'45 A
duty of disclosure will be found if a court determines that (1) a
condition unreasonably dangerous to the health and safety of
buyers exists; (2) the condition is latent; 46 (3) the seller or real
estate broker has knowledge of the condition; and (4) the seller or
real estate broker is aware, or should be aware, of the danger the
condition poses to buyers.'47 Using this criteria, courts have
143. See, e.g., Fennell Realty Co. v. Martin, 529 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Ala. 1988) (noting that
"if the [seller or real estate broker] has knowledge of a material defect or condition that
affects health or safety and the defect is not known to or readily observable by the buyer,
the [seller or real estate broker] is under a duty to disclose the defect and is liable for
damages caused by nondisclosure"); Barab v. Plumleigh, 853 P.2d 635, 639 (Idaho Ct. App.
1993) (observing that "a vendor has a duty to disclose an unreasonably dangerous condition
existing on the property"); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 418 N.W.2d 408,411 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that sellers are required to "disclose to the purchaser any
concealed condition known to [the sellers] which involves an unreasonable danger");
Anderson v. Harper, 622 A.2d 319, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 634 A.2d 222
(Pa. 1993) (stating that the "modem view ... holds that where there is a serious and
dangerous latent defect known to exist by the seller, then [the seller] must disclose such
defect to the unknowing buyer or suffer liability for his [or her] failure to do so").
But see Naramore v. Duckworth-Morris Realty Co. 669 So. 2d 946,949 (Ala. Civ. App.
1995) (finding that a listing agent does not owe the buyers of a used home a duty to disclose
defects affecting health and safety unless a confidential relationship exists between the
parties).
144. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
145. See Bareb, 853 P.2d at 639. See also Shane v. Hoffman, 324 A.2d 532, 538 (Pa.
Super. 1974) (finding that the "inundation of [a] basement with human excrement and other
waste material involve, such a clear hazard to the health of the occupants of [the] residence,
that the duty to disclose said condition is evident"); W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment
and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REV. 31 (1936), quoted in Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672,
675 (Wash. 1960) (concluding that a termite infestation was "manifestly a serious and
dangerous condition" so that "'justice, equity, and fair dealing' . . , demanded that the
[sellers] speak").
146. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1976) (describing liability for
nondisclosure of dangerous conditions known to a vendor and unknown to a purchaser). See
also Mercer v. United States, 432 F.2d 87, 88 (3d Cir. 1970) (noting approval of the use of
section 353 of the Restatement to determine whether a duty to disclose a dangerous latent
defect exists). Accord Louisville & Jefferson Co. M.S.D. v. City of Louisville, 451 S.W.2d
172, 175 (Ky. 1970); Carlson v. Hampl, 169 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn. 1969); Hut v. Antonio, 229
A.2d 823,826 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967); Reckert v. Roco Petroleum Corp., 411 S.W.2d
199, 205 (Mo. 1966); Glanski v. Ervine, 409 A.2d 425, 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979); Belote v.
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found a duty to disclose such conditions as termite infestations,"
defective sewage systems, 49 and concealed holes left in floors.110
The federal Megan's Law describes sexual predators as people
,who suffer from mental abnormalities which make them "a menace
to the health and safety of other persons."'51 The various state
Megan's Laws assert that disclosure of the presence of sexual
predators to the public is necessary because sexual predators pose
an extremely high degree of danger to people who live in close
proximity to them; consequently, members of the community must
be warned about their presence in order to protect themselves and
their children from the danger.152 Congress and the various state
legislatures have, thus, already determined that sexual predators are
dangerous to the health and safety of people living in close
proximity to them. Courts should, therefore, make the same
determination.
In addition, the presence of a sexual predator in a neighbor-
hood is not an open and obvious condition that a purchaser can be
expected to discover upon reasonable inspection of the property.
Home sellers will be notified when a sexual predator moves into
their neighborhood if, under their respective state's Megan's Law,
it is determined that the sexual predator poses a danger towards
them." 3 The Megan's Laws, however, do not contain procedures
for notifying potential purchasers of the presence of sexual
predators.'54 Thus, the presence of a sexual predator in a
neighborhood is a dangerous latent defect that the seller will be
aware of, but the buyer will not.
The presence of a sexual predator in the neighborhood does
not, however, appear to be an unreasonable danger. A danger is
made unreasonable when (1) the harm threatened is serious; (2) the
Memphis Dev. Co., 346 S.W.2d 441,442-43 (Tenn. 1961).
148. See Obde, 353 P.2d at 672. But see Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 42 N.E.2d
808, 809 (Mass. 1942) (finding that the existence of a latent termite infestation does not
justify imposing a duty of disclosure).
149. See Shane, 324 A.2d at 532.
150. See Belote, 346 S.W.2d at 441. The court noted that the hole, located in the attic of
the house, was a latent defect because it had been covered over with boards; furthermore,
it was dangerous because it created a "trap for any person who might thereafter have
occasion to be in the attic for any purpose." Id. at 444.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(D) (1994).
152. See supra Part II.C.




seller or real estate broker, has knowledge of the dangerous
condition and need only disclose the danger to the buyer to allow
the buyer to avoid the danger; and (3) the only way the buyer will
discover the danger is to suffer serious harm.1 55 For instance, a
Tennessee court concluded that a large hole left in a floor and
covered over by flimsy boards is unreasonably dangerous when not
disclosed to purchasers because purchasers are not likely to
discover such a hole until after someone has already fallen through
the hole and been injured.56 A Washington court determined
that termites are unreasonably dangerous when not disclosed
because if they are not disclosed, they will not likely be discovered;
and, if undiscovered, the termites will destroy the structural
integrity of a house.'57 A Pennsylvania court decided that a
latent defect in a sewage system which causes the basement to
flood with raw sewage is unreasonably dangerous because such a
defect will not be discovered by the buyer until after the flooding
has occurred, thereby causing harm to the purchasers.58 In all
these cases, the buyer is placed in a position of danger by the
seller's non-disclosure. If sellers or real estate brokers who are
aware of the latent danger do not disclose this information to
buyers, then no one else will. As a result, the only way the buyers
will discover the danger for themselves is to suffer harm.1 59
In the case of sexual predators identified under Megan's Laws,
buyers will be placed in a position of danger by buying a house in
a neighborhood in which a sexual predator lives. The sellers and
real estate brokers will know of this danger; however, once the
buyers actually move into the neighborhood law enforcement
officials will have the duty, under their respective state's Megan's
Law, to inform them of the danger. Once they actually become
neighbors of a sex offender, buyers will be able to learn of the
danger. Therefore, it is not clear that the interests of justice,
equity, and fair dealing will be served by requiring disclosure of
sexual predators under the justification that they are unreasonably
dangerous to the health and safety of the buyers.
155. See Shane v. Hoffman, 324 A.2d 532,538 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer,
353 P.2d 672, 674-75 (Wash. 1960); Belote v. Memphis Dev. Co., 346 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tenn.
1961).
156. See Belote, 346 S.W.2d at 444.
157. See Obde, 353 P.2d at 675.
158. See Shane, 324 A.2d at 538.
159. See id.
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b. The Duty to Disclose Latent Defects Which Are MateriaL-
Even if a latent defect is not considered to be unreasonably
dangerous to the health and safety of buyers, courts may still find
that home sellers and real estate brokers have a duty to disclose the
defect if the defect is material"6' to the transaction.' To deter-
mine whether a latent defect is material to a transaction, the focus
is not on the nature of the defect itself but on the effect such a
defect has on the use and value of the property being sold.'62 The
use and value of a property must be affected to such a degree that
the buyer will be unable to make an informed decision when
purchasing the property without full knowledge of the defect. 6
Silence about a material latent defect will, thus, cause buyers to lose
the ability to watch out for their own interests and allow sellers and
real estate brokers to receive an undeserved price for the property
at the buyers' expense.' 6 Under these circumstances, courts are
willing to curtail caveat emptor in the interests of justice, equity, and
fair dealing.165
Court decisions as to what specific kinds of latent defects will
affect the value and desirability of property involve mixed questions
of law and fact and, thus, vary from state to state."t Latent defects
which have been found to be material by various courts include:
160. See supra note 113.
161. See Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 74 (N.J. 1974) (finding that, although a
cockroach infestation was not as serious a latent defect as a termite infestation, there was a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the infestation was material to the
transaction and the seller had a duty to disclose it to the buyer).
162. See Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that "[filf
information known or accessible only to the seller has a significant and measurable effect on
market value and ... the seller is aware of this effect, [there is] no principled basis for
making the duty to disclose turn upon the character of the information").
163. See Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal, Rptr. 383, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
164. See Kaze v. Compton, 283 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Ky. 1955) (noting that the "criterion of
materiality is whether it probably influenced the making of the contract, that is, whether the
plaintiffs would have purchased the property for the price paid had they been apprised of
these conditions"). See also Weintraub, 317 A.2d at 74 (noting the possible existence of a
breach of the sellers duty of disclosure where the seller deliberately remained silent about
a cockroach infestation because he knew that knowledge of the defect would cause the buyer
to withdraw from the transaction).
165. See, e.g., Reed, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 130; Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985);
Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995); Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991); Gilbey v. Cooper, 310 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio Misc. 1973); Thacker v. Tyree, 297
S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982).
166. See Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure Legislation,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 381, 389 (1995).
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physical defects, such as leaking roofs'67 and cracked founda-
tions;' non-physical defects, such as title and deed problems; 69
psychological defects, such as a house's reputation for being
haunted' or for being the site of a brutal murder;17 and off-site
defects, such as hazardous landfills'72 and noisy neighbors.'73
There are no cases dealing directly with whether the presence of a
sexual predator in the neighborhood should be considered a latent
defect which is material to a property transaction. Cases dealing
with off-site conditions which affect neighboring properties, however,
indicate how a court might analyze a future sexual predator case.
For instance, in Strawn v. Canuso,74 the New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed a lower court holding that residential developer-
sellers and real estate brokers have a duty to disclose to buyers the
existence of off-site conditions which (1) are unknown to the buyers,
(2) are known, or should have been known, to the seller and the real
estate broker, and (3) could reasonably be expected to materially
affect the value or the desirability of the property involved in the
transaction. 75  Strawn concerned a developer-seller and a real
estate broker who had advertised a residential development as being
located in a "peaceful, bucolic setting with an abundance of fresh air
and clean lake waters." '76 The advertisement had failed to men-
tion to prospective purchasers, however, that part of this bucolic
setting consisted of a landfill containing hazardous wastes.'77
Purchasers, therefore, had bought homes in the seller's development
unaware that a landfill containing hazardous waste was located less
than one mile away.'78
In determining whether the landfill could be considered material
to property transactions occurring in the neighboring residential
development, the Strawn court started from the basic assumption
that "[l]ocation is the universal benchmark of the value and
167. See Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 625.
168. See Thacker, 297 S.E.2d at 885.
169. See Gilbey, 310 N.E.2d at 268.
170, See Starnbovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
171. See Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
172. See Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
173. See Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
174. 657 A.2d 420.
175. See id. at 431.
176. Id. at 429.
177. See id. at 423, 429.
178. See id. at 429.
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desirability of property' ' 79  Since the location of a landfill in an
area can, by itself, cause neighboring property to drop in value, the
court concluded that the location of a landfill could be material to
property transactions occurring on neighboring property s' The
court further concluded that in order to make a reasonable determi-
nation of whether a specific off-site condition could be expected to
materially affect the value or the desirability of neighboring property,
a person would have to possess expert knowledge on the market-
ability of properties and how off-site conditions such as landfills and
superhighways can affect that marketability."" According to the
Strawn court, while professional developer-sellers and real estate
brokers have that expertise, the average residential buyer does
not. 8'2 The professional sellers and real estate brokers will, under
these circumstances, be better able to determine that a particular off-
site condition is material to neighboring property than the residential
home buyer.'83 The Strawn court concluded that since professional
developer-sellers and real estate brokers are best able to determine
which off-site conditions are material and, thus, deserving of
disclosure, the law should impose upon them a duty to disclose such
conditions to home buyers in the interests of justice and fair
dealing. '84
Similar to a landfill, the presence of a sexual predator in a
neighborhood could affect the value and marketability of neighboring
properties."'5 Given the choice, the average buyer would not want
to live next to a sexual predator."' 6 Having a sexual predator in a
neighborhood would, thus, lead to a decrease in the value of the
179. Strawn, 657 A.2d at 431-32.
180. See id. at 430.
181. See id. at 432.
182. See id.
183, See id.
184. See Strawn, 657 A.2d at 428, 431.
185. There have been various acts of vigilantism directed at sex offenders identified
under Megan's Laws. See Kimball, supra note 69, at 1200. In one such incident, vigilantes
burned down the house of a sex offender identified under his state's Megan's Law in order
to drive the offender out of the neighborhood. See id. Such incidents indicate that people
have strong negative feelings towards sexual predators, and, if given the choice, the average
person would probably not buy a house next to a sexual predator.
186. Cf. Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 456 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (noting
that it is reasonable to assume that a prospective buyer would not want to move into a




houses in the neighborhood over time.1" In addition, a home
seller will be aware of the presence of a sexual predator in a
neighborhood while a purchaser will not. 8 These factors seem to
indicate that, under the Strawn test, the law should similarly impose
upon a home seller a duty to disclose the presence of a sexual
predator in the neighborhood to a buyer.
The Strawn court indicated, however, that there should be no
duty to disclose "transient social conditions" to buyers.' 9 Accord-
ing to the court, transient social conditions include such things as the
changing character of a neighborhood, the presence of a group home
in a neighborhood, and the deterioration of a neighborhood school
system.1" The court concluded that the issue of what effect such
conditions will have on the value of neighboring property was either
too speculative or too complicated for even the professional seller
and real estate broker to comprehend.1 91 The court reasoned that
professional sellers and real estate brokers would not be able to
obtain superior knowledge regarding such conditions and, therefore,
should not be held to have a duty to disclose such information to the
buyer.'92
Sexual predators can move from a neighborhood if they choose.
Therefore, they are transient. However, in the case of sexual
predators identified under Megan's Laws, home sellers will have the
advantage of superior knowledge over home purchasers. Sellers will
know that dangerous sexual predators live in the neighborhood;
purchasers will not. This lack of equality with respect to knowledge
of a condition, possibly material to a property transaction, is the
same type of situation in which the Strawn court imposed a duty of
disclosure on professional sellers. 93  Therefore, it is possible that
in the future, when a court is specifically analyzing the unique facts
relevant to a sexual predator case, the Strawn test could be used to
conclude that the presence of a sexual predator in the neighborhood
is a material defect requiring disclosure by the home seller and real
estate broker to the buyer.
187. See id. at 456 (noting that a buyer "willing to assume headaches and other emotional
discomfort in purchasing a residence will undoubtedly expect a discount for doing so").
188. Megan's Laws do not provide procedures for notifying prospective purchasers. See
supra note 43.




193. See id. at 432.
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In Alexander v. McKnight,94 a California court addressed the
materiality of the presence of overtly hostile neighbors in a neighbor-
hood, a condition the Strawn court might characterize as a "transient
social condition." The Alexander court found that the presence of
overtly hostile neighbors could depress the value of neighboring
houses and, therefore, was a material fact which had to be disclosed
to prospective purchasers of neighboring houses under California's
real estate disclosure statute.'95 California's real estate disclosure
statute specifically requires that sellers disclose neighborhood
nuisances to buyers.1
96
The Alexanders were homeowners who lived next to the
McKnights.t97 The McKnights routinely engaged in "offensive and
noxious activities" on their own property, including operating a tree
trimming business out of their house, using a noisy tree chipper at
night, engaging in late night basketball games, and pouring motor oil
on the roof of their house."'8 Following a suit brought by the
Alexanders against the McKnights for nuisance and violations of
restrictive covenants in the neighborhood, the McKnights were
enjoined from engaging in objectionable and unlawful activities on
194. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
195. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-1102.16 (West Supp. 1997). State real estate disclosure
statutes impose a duty on a home sellers to disclose a wide variety of conditions relating to
a property that is for sale to prospective purchasers. See generally Washburn, supra note 165
(discussing the various real estate disclosure laws which have been enacted). A majority of
states have enacted real estate disclosure statutes. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.70.010-.200
(Michie 1995); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-1102.16 (West Supp. 1997); 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv.
311 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2570-2578 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 508D-1 to -
20 (Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 55-2502 to -2518 (1994 & Supp. 1997); 765 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 77/1 to /99 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.6-2-1 to -13 (Michie
1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 558A.1-.8 (West Supp. 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.360
(Banks-Baldwin 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13273 (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE
ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702 (1996); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 89-1-501 to -525 (Supp. 1997); NEB.
REV, STAT. §§ 76-2, 120 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 113.060-.150 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 477:4-c (Supp. 19%); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3c-1 to -12 (West 1997); N.C. GEN
STAT. §§ 47E-1 to -10 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Anderson 1995); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 60, §§ 832 to 839 (Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.456-.490 (1995); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, §§ 1021-1036 (West Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-20.8-1 to -11 (1995); SD.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-4-37 to -44 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-5-201 to -210
(Supp. 1996); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 5.008, 5.094-,095 (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 55-517 to -525 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 64.06.010 -.050 (West Supp.
1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 709.01-.08 (West Supp. 1996).
196. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6(C)(11).




their property.99 The court that granted the Alexanders' relief
against the McKnights, however, also determined that if the
Alexanders ever sold their house, they would have to disclose to
purchasers the past activities of the McKnights because the Califor-
nia disclosure statute required that nuisances that have occurred on
a property be disclosed by residential sellers to prospective buy-
ers 2c° The Alexander court affirmed this finding.21
In so doing, the Alexander court noted that the provisions of the
real estate disclosure statute must be interpreted liberally by
California courts so that buyers will be fully informed about matters
that affect the value of property that is for sale. 2 In addition,
using reasoning similar to that in Strawn, °3 the Alexander court
noted that determinations of whether a particular defect is material
to a transaction are fact-specific and depend on the degree to which
the defect impinges on the value or desirability of a property.'
Unlike the Strawn court which stressed that only real estate
professionals could understand how an off-site condition might affect
the marketability of neighboring homes and, thus, become mate-
rial," the Alexander court noted that a trier of fact could make a
determination on an off-site condition's materiality either on the
basis of expert testimony or on his or her personal knowledge and
experience.' Less reliant on specialized expert knowledge, the
Alexander court found that it was reasonable to assume that a
prospective buyer would not want to purchase a house in a neighbor-
hood where the neighbors were hostile to each other.0 7 This, in
turn, would lead to a reduction in the market value of the neighbor-
ing property because buyers would not be willing to pay full price for
a house that comes with the emotional discomfort of having to deal
with hostile neighbors. 8
Consequently, the Alexander court found that the presence of
overtly hostile neighbors was material to property transactions
occurring on neighboring properties and must be disclosed by sellers
199. See id. at 454.
200. See id. at 455.
201. See id. at 456.
202. See Alexander, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455.
203. Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
204. See Alexander, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455.
205, See Strawn, 657 A.2d at 432.
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to buyers.' ° The presence of a sexual predator in a neighborhood
would have a similar depressing effect on property values. A sexual
predator is an individual who has engaged in violent sexual acts
against another in the past and is likely to do so in the future.2"
In comparison, the past activities of the hostile neighbors in
Alexander seem almost innocuous. A court willing to find hostile
neighbors as material to a transaction must take a similar view with
respect to a sexual predator in the neighborhood.
IV Conclusion
Megan's Laws stand for the proposition that people have a right
to know when they are living in close proximity to a dangerous
sexual predator."' 1 This right to know is considered to be of the
utmost importance in protecting the health and safety of the people
who live in close proximity to sexual predators, especially chil-
dren. 2 ' People considering moving into a neighborhood should
have the right to know facts which will materially affect the value of
their property and, more importantly, about situations that will
threaten their welfare and safety. People have a right to know that
they are moving into a dangerous situation. It would be unfair and
unjust to simply allow a family to move next door to a dangerous
sexual predator, unaware of that fact.
These considerations call for the requirement that prospective
home purchasers be informed of the presence of dangerous sexual
predators living in a neighborhood who have been identified under
Megan's Laws before they make their decision to buy a house.
Home sellers and real estate brokers are in the best position to
notify prospective purchasers of the presence of dangerous sexual
predators."1 3 Therefore, they should be given the duty to do so.
Application of this duty may impose a heavy burden upon home
sellers and real estate brokers, but public policy, health, and safety
considerations demand such an imposition.
Additionally, this duty must be imposed statutorily. The law of
real estate transactions in the United States is far from uniform or
static. The duties and obligations of home sellers and real estate
209. See id.
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(C) (1994).
211. See supra Part II.C,
212. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text,
213. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
19971
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brokers vary widely from state to state and are constantly evolving.
Therefore, the various state legislatures must act to ensure the
resolution of this current uncertainty regarding disclosure to
prospective purchasers of the presence of a sexual predator.1
Lori A. Polonchak
214. This is true even if a particular state is unwilling to impose such a duty on residential
sellers or real estate brokers.
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